explicit expressions for the corresponding direct utility function, conditional demand equations, and concavity conditions in both price~income and quantity space. These results are then used in an empirical static femily labor supply model, in which kinked budget constraints and unemployment benefits are taken into account for both spouses. Imposition of concavity is necessary for consistent estimation and the concavity constraint appears to be binding. For females, we find a strongly forward bending labor supply function and a strong impact of the tax system.
For males, the own wage elasticity appears to be small and negative. For both spouses, we find small cross-wage elasticities in the unconditional labor supply equations and, correspondingly, small elasticities with respect Lo the partner's working hours in the conditional labor supply equation. The larger part of the recent labor supply literature is devoted to the explanation of female labor supply decisions, thereby addressing the theoretical and econometric problems associated with non-participation, non-linear and non-convex budget sets and stochastic specification (see, for example Heckman (1974) , Hausman (1979 Hausman ( , 1980 Hausman ( , 1985 , Moffitt (1986) , Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) . Blundell and Meghir (1986) and Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1987) ). In these papers, male labor supply decisions usually play a role only through a(by assumption exogenous) explanatory variable other household income, which includes male labor earnings.
In this paper we adopt the more general approach of modelling male and female labor supply simultaneously. First of all, there is some evidence that the exogeneity assumption of 'other household income' in female labor supply models is not always tenable; see Smith and Blundell (1986) . More importantly, male and female labor supply decisions within a household are likely to be fundamentnlly interrelated and a full understanding of household's Iabor supply behavior requires to take this ínterrelationship into account in setting up the empirical model.
The joint modelling of male and female labor supply creates some specific problems in addition to those encountered in modelling individual labor supply. One of the issues is how to represent the householcj members'
preferences. We will follow the usual approach of assuming that preferences can be represented by a joint household utility function with male leísure, female leisure and total household consumption as arguments. There have been some attempts to develop more general procedures, in which the spouses are allowed to have different preferences and household behavior is the outcome of a game. In order to derive demand functions one then has to specify a certain concept of equilibrium (see Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) , for example). However valuable this approach may be from a theoretical point of view, its empirical implementation has not (yet) been very succesful, the main reason being that the available data do usuelly not allow to identify both utility functions, and to infer which equilibrium concept is appropriate.
A second issue that comes up specifically in modelling joint male and female labor supply is that one ususlly also has to derive conditional supply equations, i.e. equations that give optimal labor supply of a household member, given a fixed number of hours of labor supply by the partner. Wales and Woodland (1980) and later on extensively by Ransom (198~a, 198~b) . The main disadvantage of this system is the existence of a satiation point, which limits the area in quantity space that can be described by the system. In the case of random preferences, it means that the range of the stochastic parameters has to be restricted. This point will be discussed in slightly more detail in the concluding section. Except for this one complication the dírect quadratic utility function is a convenient specification. Yet it seems worthwhile to investigate alternatives, if only for the reason that empirical demand systems are not necessarily described well by the quadratic specification. A second flexible system with reasonable tractability has been introduced by Hausman and Ruud (1984) .
Since the properties of the Hausman-Ruud system have not been discussed in the literature extensively, we provide a rather elaborate analysis of the system, including the derívation of the conditional supply equations, the computation of direct utility and the imposition of concavity in wages of the cost function. The need to compute direct utility in an arbitrary point of the choice set may arise if the budget set is non-convex in which case different local utility maxima on convex subsets of the budget set have to be compared. Imposition of concavity in a relevant range of wages is sometimes necessary in empirical applications, as the likelihood function of the model may not be well-defined if concavity is not satisfied.
The practical importance of these issues will be illustrated in an empirical example given in Section 4. In Section 5 we make a brief comparison between the direct qudratic and the Hausman-Ruud. There we also discuss the importance of modelling the labor supply of spouses jointly. The corresponding indirect utility function is given by
where u denotes the household's real non-labor income. u" can be interpreted as the difference (in real terms) between non-labor income and the expenditures needed to reach utility level 0.
Application of Roy's identity yields the following labor supply functions:
where h"-(hm, hf)' is the vector of optimal numbers of working hours of husband and wife respectively.
Concavity
The use of the function given by (1) is limited by the usual regularity conditions on expenditure functions. For this specification, only concavity has to be considered, i.e. the matrix of second order partial derivatives of the expenditure function m~ist be negative semi-definite and of rank 2; homogeneity and monotonicity with respect to u are satisfied automatically.
It is easy to show, that concavity is equivalent to
B~H'pp' -A is negative definitel)
From now on we assume that the matrix A is non-singular.
Note that, if S'A-lp f 0, a necessary condition for concavity i s given by
(3') If g~0 and S'A-1~6-G, then B is negative definite for no value of H~. This case is excluded from now on. In the special case that A is positive definite, it is easy to prove that (3') is not only necessary but also sufficient for (3).
(See, for a proof of a more general result, Bekker (1986)).
The application of duality theory strongly hinges on the concavity condition; without this property, there is no utility maximizing problem behind the labor supply equations. Therefore, (3) must hold for all relevant (w,H), including shadow wages and corresponding virtual incomes.
The Direct Utility function
Non-convexity of the budget set makes it necessary to compare the values of the direct utility function in different points. We shall derive the direct utility function by calculating the utility level in some arbitrary point (hm,hf,y), where y is the household's consumption (or income):
Let k be the vector h-b, where h-(hm,hf)'. Given (hm,hf,y), we first seek (shadow-)wages w and corresponding non-labor income H satisfying k -H~~. Aw
B is j ust the Hessian of the expenditure function. Since the expenditure function i s defined in terms of real wage rates, the ususal condition that the Hessian of the expenditure function is negative semi-definite, is replaced by (3).
Inserting the solution (w,x) from (5), (6) and (~) in the indirect utility function (1) then yields the utility level at (hm,hf,y).
Equations (5) through (~) yield, after substituting (~) into (6):
Substituting (8) into (9) Yields a quadratic equation in x~:
2xN2R'A-1P -x~-2k'A-lk t y t 8-0
and if x~is known, w can be found from (8}:
Thus (w,x) can be determined iff (10) has a real solution, i.é. iff
(10)
a solution (w,x) is only feasible if it satisfies concavity condition (3).
Obviously, if s-0, the solution of (10) and (11) is unique and it satisfies (3) if and only if A is positive definite. If g~0 end (12) holds, then (10) and (11) yield (at most) two solutions (w,x~) and only the smallest of the two satisfies the necessary condition (3'):
If this solution satisfies (3), then it is feasible and the utility level is given by
6
The reader should be aware of the relation between invertibility (i.e. the question whether ( wm,wf,H) can be solved as a function of (hm,hf,y)) and concavity ( i.e. well-behavior of the direct or indirect utility function). As usual in dually specified systems, the concavity condition i nvolves ( shadow-) wages and i t can therefore only be checked i n (hm,hf,y)-space i f invertibility is guaranteed. In the special case of a positive definite matrix A, a specific property of the specification used i s the fact that, i f (wm,wf,H) cen be found, then exactly one solution satisfies the concavity conditions (i.e.:
"invertibility gvarantees concavity").
Rationed labor supply
In this subsection, we derive rationed labor supply functions, i.e.
labor supply for one individual if -for some reason -the partner's number of working hours is fixed. This means, that the household maximizes utility, taking into account some binding constraint on one of the three goods.
Rationed supply curves can be determined using shadow-wages and sha-
dow-income ( see Neary 8~Roberts (1980)).2)
We derive the female's rationed labor supply hf for given hm, actusl real wage rates wm and wf and real nonlabor income u.
(The male's rationed labor supply can be derived in exactly the same way)
We search for a shadow wage rate wm and corresponding H, such that hm -mH~r ymwm t awf . bm
-w If e feasible solution ( wm,u) (with corresponding x) is found, optimal female labor supply is given by
Rationed supply curves can alternatively be determined using first order conditions for maximization of the direct utility function, which is explicitly derived in section 2.3, subject to the budget constraint and the ration levels. 
If wm is found, then u, u and hf follow immediately from (15) and (16).
The solution is feasible iff it satisfies concavity condition (3).
We focus on the "regular" case, i.e.~m ym
If (18) 
19)
Since the matrix m2YmpR'-A is indefinite or semi-definite and the matrix pS' is positive semi-definite, it is easy to see that only one solution can be Feasible:
Note that, even in the special case of a positive defínite matrix A, this solution is not necessarily feasible: condition (3) should always be checked.
Thus, the relation between "partial invertibility" and concavity is different from the relation between "full invertibility" and concavity, which was discussed in Section 2.3.
In this section we derived the conditional female labor supply function hf(wf,hm,ut mhm) corresponding to household preferences given by (14) . The result is a closed form expression for hf. Lundberg (1988) follows a different strategy: She starts with conditional demand functions in some convenient form and dces not discuss the issue whether it is possible to find a household utility function corresponding to these equations. Our approach has the advantage that, since a closed form expression of the indirect utility function is available, it is easy to check whether the underlying system of preferences satisfies regularity properties (e.g. concavity) end allows for the use of non-convex budget sets. A similar situation arises if individual budget sets are piecewise linear and convex (see e.g., Blomquist (1983) and Hausman (19~9)), es in the case where spouses file separately and the tax system is progressive and piecewise linear. The household budget set in this case is depicted in Figure   1 . In The Netherlands, this budget set is a reasonable approximation for families not entitled to unemployment benefits. If, for example, the optimal number of the husband's working hours is at a kink, then female labor supply is not given by (2) but by the conditional labor supply function given in Section 2.4.
Ap~l i-cations
If the budget set is non-convex, comparison of values of the direct utility function is necessary to determine the optimum, as is described in Section 2.3. Unemployment benefits or fixed costs of working are common phenomena causing such non-convexities, in particular at zero hours of work. 
An empirical example
In this section, we present an application of the model studied in Section 2. A similar model, estimated for a different data set, can be found in Kapteyn~Woíttiez (1988) . In that paper, some of the results derived here have been used. For the rest, the Kapteyn~Woittiez paper concentrates on different issues, particularly habit formation and preference i nterdependence.
In our model preferred hours of husband and wife are the endogenous variables, for reasons discussed in Section 3.
Specification of the model
Since each individual provides his or her preferred number of working hours, taking the partner's actual labor supply as given, only conditional labor supply functions are relevant. From the individusl's point of view the household budget-set is therefore only two-dimensional. In Figures 2a end 2b , approximate budget sets are drawn for a female, whose husband works hm hours a week.
-------------------------------------------------------
3) A typical wording of the survey question asking for preferred hours is: "How many hours would you like to work if you could choose freely and if your hourly after tax wage rate remains as it is now? Assume that other family members do not change their number of working hours" If a female is unemployed and receives benefits cf~0, the budget set is non-convex. We assume, that the individual looses all benefits at the moment she works slightly more than zero hours. This assumption is in itself incorrect, but since the marginal tax rate on increased earnings for someone on unemployment compensation is close to 100x, so that a choice of a number of hours corresponding with en earned income below the unemployment benefit level is unlikely, it appears to be rather harmless.
The optimum in this case (see Figure 2b ) cen be either 0 hours or hf, depending on the fact whether the utility level UO-U(hm,0,ut mhmtcf) exceeds Figure 2b , the former is the case). The stochastic specification in utility rationing models is a delicate problem, even in the case of a convex budget set (see, e.g., Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986) If a female does receive an unemployment compensation, we only know whether she is seriously looking for a job or not. The optimization error is incorporated as an error in the "regime choice":
U1-U(hm,max(O,hf),Htwm mtwf,ma~c(O,hf)) or not. (In
v -ul-u~t nf.
-
------------------------------------------------------nf
3) For individuals who work less than 15 hours a week, it is only known whether preferred hours exceed actual hours or not. It is straightforward to take this into account, considering hp as a latent variable. 
Date and estimation results
The data used stem from a labor mobility survey conducted in The households. The analysis here is restricted to families with at least two adults. Also, self-employed, students, and disabled people are omitted from the semple. As a result, in the estimation of the household labor suppiy model, data on 520 households were used. Some semple statistics are given in Table 1 .
The before tax wage rates in Table 1 
Covariance matrix of the parameter estimates is estimated as outer product.
6) The estimate of B attains its upper bound (due to the imposition of concavity) so no standard error could be computed. ) A table with likelihood contributions is available on request. The likelihood contributions vary according to whether one or two spouses are participating, whether or not the budget set is convex, whether or not preferred hours are zero, etc.
8)
For a positive definite matrix A, concavity is equivalent to (3'). Substituting (19) and (18) This restriction -and a similar one for male labor supply -has been imposed for all sample observations. Figure 3d are hence hyperbolas. The same kind of non-differentiabilities is in principle also present in Figure 3a , but in this case the hyperbola parts are so small that the drawing cannot reveal them. This is caused by the very small male own wage effect.
The difference in own wage elasticities is borne out by Figure  4 in which some indifference curves are depicted, using the results of Section 2.3. Figure 4 suggest that actually not much will happen in such a case, but of course one can only know that after an empirical analysis in which the interaction of both spouses has been taken into account properly.
A drawback of the Hausman-Ruud specification might seem to be that it is difficult to allow for random preferences in a utility consistent way. At first sight the direct quadratic utility function does not suffer from such a problem. Ransom (1987b) presents a specification with random errors and provides conditions under which the ensuing model is coherent. The conditions are easy to impose and estimation of the model by ML is rather straightforward. It turns out however that for certain values of the random preferences the bliss point of the direct quadratic utility function is inside zo the budget constraint, and in such a case the demand equations do not represent a utility maximum. We have shown elsewhere (Van Soest, Kooreman, and Kapteyn (1988}) , that the restrictions on the random preferences which are required to prevent this from happening are identical to the restrictions that have to be imposed in the Hausman-Ruud system on the random preferences to guarantee a well-behaved system. Therefore, there are no compelling a priori reasons to prefer one system or the other; we have two reasonably tractable flexible sytems available which can be used for the analysis of household labor supply in the presence oF kinks and corners, and the choice between them in each case should be based on the data at hand.
